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6Summary
 ●  The private rented sector has played a critical role in increasing and 
improving housing provision in the UK. Around 80 per cent of private 
sector tenants are satisfied with their homes and satisfaction in the 
sector compares favourably with that in the social rented sector. This 
contribution has gone unrecognised: instead, landlords have been 
made scapegoats for a housing crisis primarily caused by land-use 
planning restrictions.
 ●  The government has recently passed tax measures that discriminate 
against private rented housing, both as an asset class and as a form 
of housing tenancy. The most damaging of these measures is ‘Section 
24’1 which prevents landlords entirely offsetting interest against rents 
before taxable profits are calculated. This move is unjustifiable and 
will raise rents. The Treasury’s rationale for the tax change has no 
justification in public finance economics and it is concerning that the 
Treasury would make the arguments that it has made. 
 ●  As a result of Section 24, many landlords will pay huge amounts of tax 
as a proportion of profits. Interest rate rises are likely to cause the tax 
rate to exceed 100 per cent of their underlying profit in some cases. 
Tax will even be payable by some landlords who make a loss.
 ●  The government has also increased Stamp Duty on buy-to-let properties. 
Stamp Duty in general is widely regarded as one of the worst taxes 
from an economic efficiency point of view. The late James Mirrlees, 
Nobel Prize winner in economics wrote: ‘There is no sound case for 
1 This refers to Section 24 of the 2015 Finance Act.
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maintaining stamp duty and we believe that it should be abolished’ 
and ‘Stamp duty and business rates defy the most basic of economic 
principles by taxing transactions and produced inputs respectively’. The 
government’s decision to increase Stamp Duty on buy-to-let properties 
will also damage the market and raise rents.
 ●  The increase in Stamp Duty was introduced with the expressed intention 
of promoting buying over renting. This may happen at the margin. 
However, any such effects will benefit a small minority of potential 
purchasers who will be relatively well off. 
 ●  Increases in taxes on landlords are likely to reduce the supply of rental 
housing, increase rents, reduce quality and reduce the size of the 
‘professional’ landlord sector which is most affected by the changes.
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In recent years, the private-rented sector has grown as a proportion of 
total housing provision. The sector has also come under scrutiny. Partly 
as a result of this scrutiny and popular pressure, from the 2015 Budget 
onwards, tax measures have been introduced which discriminate against 
the provision of rented property when compared either with other forms 
of business assets or with other forms of housing provision. Many of the 
justifications for these tax changes are spurious and are shown to be in 
this paper. 
The impact of recent tax changes is likely to be to increase rents and 
reduce the supply of private-rented property. Indeed, they may reduce the 
overall supply of property. Costly measures might be taken to avoid the 
increased taxes resulting from the changes. The tax changes will also 
make the tax system more complex and could lead to penal tax charges 
in some situations – for example, tax rates of over 100 per cent of income 
or tax charges when losses are made. 
This paper proposes rolling back the recent tax changes in relation to let 
property. It also proposes other tax reforms that will move the overall tax 
system for residential property towards one that will better promote 
economic welfare.
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The role of the private rented 
sector in housing provision
In recent years, the government has imposed a number of tax measures 
that have been designed to raise costs in the private-rented housing sector. 
These measures could only be justified on economic grounds, if, in some 
way, private-rented housing caused some social harm so that measures 
to reduce its supply via increased taxation would raise economic welfare; 
but it doesn’t. In the UK, as in other countries, private-rented housing is 
a key component of the housing market. It has increased in extent and 
improved in quality in the last 30 years as, after years of rent control and 
other government interventions, the private-rented sector has flourished.
In the 20 years from 1996/97, the number of households in privately-rented 
dwellings rose by 2.6 million. In the same period, the proportion of 
households who lived in private rented tenure, as compared with social 
housing and owner-occupation, doubled to 20 per cent (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government 2017). In part, the increase in private 
rented housing leads to new stock as there is investment in conversion 
of non-residential buildings, new build, conversion of houses into flats, 
and the updating of stock that might otherwise fall into disrepair. Without 
this additional stock, the housing shortage in the UK would be even more 
acute and rents and house prices would be higher.
Despite this increase in private sector renting, the image of a private sector 
landlord is not uniformly positive.2 This may be partly because private 
landlords own and let out properties that are amongst the oldest in the 
housing stock. In addition, some of their tenants are from groups who are 
2  See, for example, ‘A licence to rent?’, Campaigns Briefing, Shelter, http://england.
shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/206779/A_Licence_to_rent_Briefing.pdf
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staying in the property for a short period of time. It is, though, worth noting 
that the proportion of private renters in homes defined as ‘non-decent’ 
decreased dramatically between 2006 and 2016, from over 45 per cent 
to 27 per cent: so, there has been considerable improvement in the quality 
as well as the quantity of private rented housing. Although 27 per cent 
might still seem high, the Decent Homes Standard has been designed 
specifically as a standard that should be met by local-authority-controlled 
housing. It is therefore not surprising that it is met by a greater proportion 
of local authority housing than private rented housing.
Indeed, when data on tenant satisfaction are analysed, social renters and 
private renters show roughly equal levels of satisfaction with their 
accommodation, but social renters are more likely to express dissatisfaction 
or to be very dissatisfied. Social renters are also less satisfied with the 
repairs and maintenance carried out by their landlords (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government 2017).
As will be explained, the fiscal measures implemented recently raise costs 
in the private rented sector and are likely to raise rents. There is no clear 
economic justification for the measures and, notably, the Treasury’s 
justification for them has been spurious.
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Abolition of so-called ‘tax relief’ 
for private landlords
When George Osborne, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced 
in his Budget speech of July 2015 that he would ‘restrict tax relief for 
financing costs for “individual” landlords’, commentators were taken by 
surprise. One of the authors of this paper had already examined this policy, 
however, because a variation on it had formed part of the Green Party 
manifesto at the 2015 general election.3 The proposals announced in the 
Budget became Section 24 of the Finance Act.
In fact, the phrase ‘tax relief’ was a misnomer. Landlords receive no tax 
reliefs. Rather, the tax position of private-sector landlords involved allowing 
legitimate finance costs to be deducted from income when they calculated 
their rental profits. Under George Osborne’s proposals, finance costs would 
no longer be deducted from income. However, there was to be a tax ‘rebate’ 
for unincorporated landlords of up to 20 per cent of their finance costs.
It can be said that the fact that the deduction of financing costs when 
calculating taxable profits had historically been called a ‘tax relief’ by 
HMRC made it easier to justify the change. However, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), in their submission 
to the Finance Bill Committee following the Budget, declared: ‘The idea 
that landlords will be taxed on the profit of their businesses, but not be 
allowed to offset the costs of creating that taxable profit is absurd, unjust 
and unsustainable. It overturns a fundamental, centuries-old principle of 
3  See Booth, P., ‘The Green interview: failed on style, but what about the substance?’, 
IEA Blog, 27 February 2015, https://iea.org.uk/blog/the-green-interview-
%E2%80%93-failed-on-style-what-about-the-substance
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taxation.’4 This change could lead to arbitrary and very high rates of effective 
taxation on rental income as can be seen by the example in Box 1.
Box 1: Case study
The best way to understand the effect of Section 24 is to examine 
how it works in practice by looking at a case study.
Caroline has been a portfolio landlord in the south of England for 
about 20 years. Until recently she let properties to all kinds of tenants, 
including those on low incomes. She had 40 flats and houses. 
In 2015, her properties generated £333,000 in rent. Maintenance 
and other business costs totalled £113,000, and she paid £155,000 
in mortgage interest. The profit from her portfolio was £65,000 and 
her tax bill was £15,200.5 This left net income of £49,800. 
By the time Section 24 of the 2015 Finance Act is fully implemented 
in 2021, her tax bill on the same profit will be £54,100 and she will 
have post-tax income of £10,900. 
Before it was decided to partially disallow interest as a business 
cost, her effective tax rate was 23.4 per cent. After the reform, her 
effective tax rate is 83 per cent of the underlying profit. This very 
high effective tax rate does not arise because the profit is high and 
therefore taxed at a high rate in a progressive tax system. It arises 
simply because the portfolio of properties is partly financed by 
borrowing. The interest on that borrowing is taxed in the hands of 
those who provide the finance. Not allowing the cost of borrowing 
to be deducted as a business expense is therefore double taxation 
at an arbitrary rate. 
4  See: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/finance/memo/fb80c.pdf
5  The basis of the calculations are available from the authors. The tax paid takes into 
account income, tax rates and relevant allowances. 
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If interest rates increase, the cost of the partial disallowance of 
interest as a business cost increases. If the business makes a loss 
because interest payments and maintenance costs are higher than 
rents received, Caroline will still face a tax charge: the tax rate on 
profit would be infinite. Alternatively, and more plausibly, such a 
small profit would be made that the tax bill would be greater than 
the profit.6
To avoid bankruptcy, Caroline has increased rents. As some tenants 
on benefits cannot afford these higher rents, she has had to replace 
them with employed people. This has led to 18 of her tenants on 
benefits being evicted from nine properties, on which the rents have 
gone up by an average of 10 per cent. In order to still have a net 
income of £49,800, Caroline would have to increase rents by 
£71,000, or 21 per cent, between 2016 and March 2020. She will 
not be any better off: her tenants will be worse off.
If landlords such as Caroline are not able to obtain higher rents to 
cover the tax levy, they face having to sell their properties, possibly 
in a flooded market where they have to accept low offers as others 
need to sell for the same reason. 
6  Marginal tax rates of over 100 per cent are not uncommon. However, it is difficult 
to think of an example anywhere else in the tax system where an average tax rate 
of over 100 per cent would exist so that the tax bill would be bigger than a person’s 
income.
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Errors in Treasury reasoning
It is disturbing that, in introducing and justifying the measure to charge 
tax on the financing costs of buy-to-let property, the Treasury does not 
appear to understand the basic principles of taxation which would be 
taught, for example, in an undergraduate public finance course or in the 
basic examinations of the Chartered Institute of Taxation. The incoherence 
of the measure and the reasoning behind it has been noted by Paul 
Johnson of the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (see above), amongst others. 
‘Levelling the playing field’ with owner-occupied housing
In introducing the restriction of ‘tax relief’ on buy-to-let property, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, explicitly argued that it 
would level the playing field between owner-occupied and let housing in 
relation to taxation: ‘Buy-to-let landlords have a huge advantage in the 
market as they can offset their mortgage interest payments against their 
income, whereas homebuyers cannot.’7
This statement is clearly false, or at best meaningless. Owner occupiers 
can be thought of as owning houses and renting them to themselves. The 
rent that would be paid had their home been let out on the open market 
is often known as ‘imputed rent’. Owner occupiers do not pay any tax on 
the imputed rent from their properties at all: such a tax was abolished in 
1963. Until 1963, when owner occupiers paid tax on imputed rent, they 
did, in fact, receive tax relief on mortgage interest. This was intended as 
an offset against the imputed rent that was taxed, just as mortgage interest 
costs for landlords are an offset against the rent they receive before tax 
7 2015 Budget speech.
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is calculated. As it happens, when the tax on imputed rent was abolished, 
the tax relief on mortgage interest for owner occupiers remained for many 
years. This was an anomaly because there was no taxed income from 
the property against which to offset the mortgage interest. Arguably, tax 
relief on mortgages was kept to promote owner occupation. The tax relief 
was abolished in 2000.
Given that owner occupiers as such do not pay any tax at all, the question 
of allowing them to offset financing costs before calculating taxable income 
simply does not arise. There is nothing against which finance costs can 
be offset. The Treasury does not receive any tax from an owner-occupier 
who buys a property financed by a mortgage. However, if somebody buys 
a house using a mortgage and lets it out, tax is paid on the rental income 
after the costs of the landlord are deducted. It is a basic principle of tax 
policy that the landlord should pay tax on the rent received after deducting 
business costs.
Buy-to-let landlords versus share traders
In the letter TO2016/23599,8 the Treasury repeats the argument addressed 
above. It also goes on to argue that tax relief is not available to those who 
borrow to invest in shares. This latter argument is not totally incorrect but 
is hardly a reasonable comparison. Firstly, any vehicle, such as an 
investment trust, which borrows to invest in shares can offset the cost of 
borrowing before determining taxable income. The situation of personal 
borrowing being undertaken to finance investment in shares is unusual. 
But, even so, this comparison is of minimal relevance. Buying houses to 
let is akin to creating a business with fixed capital, not akin to buying 
securities such as shares, and should be treated like other businesses 
with fixed capital.
8  See: https://www.property118.com/treasury-response-to-section-24-report-by-dr-
rosalind-beck/
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‘Tax relief’ benefits people on higher incomes
George Osborne’s 2015 Budget speech and letter TO2016/23599 both 
assert that the offsetting of interest against rental income benefits landlords 
on higher incomes because the tax saved is greater for such individuals. 
Again, this is not true and, as an argument, would not be regarded as 
consistent with the basic principles of public finance.
Firstly, the ability to deduct interest payments from rental income before 
calculating tax is not a ‘relief’ against taxable income because the income 
that is taxed is never received by the landlord – it is paid out as a business 
cost to the financier of the mortgages taken out to purchase the property. 
Allowing the landlord to deduct interest costs on mortgages before 
calculating taxable income does not confer any benefit upon the landlord 
because the landlord does not receive as income that part of the rent used 
to pay interest on the loans. Not allowing the landlord to fully deduct interest 
before calculating taxable profits imposes an additional tax on the income 
that higher-rate taxpayers receive from buy-to-let properties. This is 
because they are charged tax on income that they do not receive: that is, 
they pay tax on money that is paid out to banks that finance the properties 
through mortgages or other forms of lending.
As is noted in the case study (see Box 1), Caroline will receive an income 
of £10,900. This is below the threshold for basic rate tax and well below 
the threshold for higher rate tax. Under the proposals, the tax paid by 
landlords will not depend on their income, but on the total amount they 
receive in rents from their properties. The equivalent for any other form 
of small business would be to tax turnover rather than profit. This would 
be an innovation in tax policy. It should be noted that the extent of landlords’ 
tax bills will not just depend on their income but on whether they finance 
their properties by borrowing or equity. 
Levelling the playing field with incorporated landlords
Letter TO2016/23599 also argues that the move by the Treasury to limit 
the extent to which finance costs can be used to determine the tax rate 
on rental income brings the buy-to-let sector into line with the position of 
incorporated landlords. The letter argues that such landlords can only 
obtain tax relief on interest costs that are incurred in financing housing 
provision at the corporation tax rate (now 19 per cent) rather than at the 
top marginal rate of tax. This argument is also wrong.
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If let property is held within a company, the company pays corporation tax 
at 19 per cent on profits. Interest on let property is fully deducted before 
calculating the profit that is taxed. That profit is then taxed at 19 per cent. 
Dividends can then be paid which would be further taxed in the hands of 
a higher-rate taxpayer. However, the interest has been fully deducted from 
rental income before taxable profits are calculated and distributed as a 
dividend. There is, therefore, no question of any tax being paid on the 
interest financing costs of the property portfolio by the owners of the 
company. For an unincorporated landlord, the interest costs of financing 
the property portfolio are now not deducted before tax is calculated.
Compounding the errors
These errors of reasoning are greatly concerning because they come from 
the heart of the Treasury as well as the former Chancellor of the Exchequer 
himself. The UK has an extremely complicated tax code. One of the 
reasons for that is the implementation of a succession of measures 
designed to promote particular political objectives over a number of years 
by different governments. However, such measures should at least be 
justified and understood as deviations from public finance principles. The 
Treasury should not pretend that a measure removes a distortion when 
it does not or that it does not create a distortion when it does. 
Further tax proposals have been made by a Conservative MP and former 
adviser to both George Osborne and Theresa May (see O’Brien 2018). 
O’Brien proposed that George Osborne’s measure should be extended 
further so that landlords’ legitimate finance costs would be completely 
disallowed before calculating the tax position of landlords for all new rented 
housing. As most private landlords need to take out a buy-to-let mortgage 
to fund a new-build or the purchase (and often renovation) of a property 
to rent out, this could lead to the drying up of the supply of private rented 
housing. O’Brien used the same justification as the Treasury had used for 
its 2015 Budget measure, arguing that this would level the playing field 
with owner-occupied housing. He also suggested that landlords should 
no longer be allowed to claim furnishings in a rented house as a legitimate 
expense, because ‘owner-occupiers cannot’. Again, this ignores the fact 
that there is no taxed rental income against which owner occupiers could 
deduct such costs because the already favourable treatment of owner-
occupied housing relative to private rented housing ensures that there is 
no tax on owner-occupation at all.
18
Premium rate Stamp Duty Land 
Tax on buy-to-let properties
Subsequent Budgets and Autumn Statements imposed further tax changes 
on landlords. These are arbitrary in the sense that they have been chosen 
to apply to specific types of business investor. The most important of these 
was the imposition of an additional 3 per cent Stamp Duty Land Tax levy 
on anyone purchasing a second home (whether it is for owner occupation 
or let out to tenants). This was announced in the 2015 Autumn Statement 
in a section which was very critical of the buy-to-let let market.9 In announcing 
the measure, Osborne argued: 
And the fifth part of our housing plan addresses the fact that more 
and more homes are being bought as buy-to-lets or second homes. 
Many of them are cash purchases that aren’t affected by the 
restrictions I introduced in the Budget on mortgage interest relief; 
and many of them are bought by those who aren’t resident in this 
country. Frankly, people buying a home to let should not be squeezing 
out families who can’t afford a home to buy.
This statement is revealing as it suggests that the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had an intrinsic preference for buying over renting. Such an 
intrinsic preference, if soundly grounded, could provide a justification for 
the differential tax treatment of rented and owner-occupied property. 
However, the Treasury had not previously used such an argument.
9  See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-george-osbornes-
spending-review-and-autumn-statement-2015-speech. It is also notable that there 
was explicit discrimination against married couples in this change. 
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Indeed, given that almost all houses are either let or owner-occupied, the 
existence of any let houses must be ‘squeezing out’ buyers at the margin. 
This raises the question of whether George Osborne was suggesting that 
there should be no houses to let. Or did George Osborne simply think that 
there were ‘too many’ let houses and so tax discrimination against letting 
had to be introduced? If so, it would have been good practice to explain 
explicitly the criteria by which he judged that the market is producing too 
many let houses so that a judgement could be made about the appropriate 
policy response and whether, in its own terms, it had been successful 
when ultimately evaluated.
People rent because it is the preferable option in the situation in which 
they find themselves given market rents and prices. Restricting the supply 
of homes for rent will make renting more expensive for renters and is, 
indeed, likely to reduce the number of let properties and increase the 
number of owner-occupied houses. However, this will only allow a small 
number of people at the margin to purchase a home. Those marginal 
buyers are likely to be a non-representative subset of people. It is likely 
that they will be richer on average than those who rent and whose rents 
rise because of the reduced supply and increased costs of renting.
When it comes to the specific measure of supplementary Stamp Duty, it 
should be noted that this is a tax on transactions that is widely regarded 
as one of the most damaging taxes. As Mirrlees et al. (2011) put it in their 
monumental work Tax by Design, ‘There is no sound case for maintaining 
stamp duty and we believe that it should be abolished’ (p. 404) and ‘Stamp 
duty and business rates defy the most basic of economic principles by 
taxing transactions and produced inputs respectively’ (p. 405).
Tax changes that furthered the differential treatment of owned and let 
property continued in the 2016 Budget. This announced substantial cuts 
in capital gains tax. However, an exception was made for residential 
property.10 Once again, this measure introduced differences in tax treatment 
between returns to capital derived from the provision of let residential 
housing as compared with returns to capital from other forms of business 
investment. Thus, it raises the cost of capital for the provision of housing 
relative to other forms of business activity.
10  This exception would only apply to let residential property and second homes, as an 
individual’s primary residence is exempt. 
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The seen and the unseen –  
the impact of taxes on the 
housing sector
It is reasonable to assume that the first-round impact of these tax measures 
is felt by the landlord. The underlying and longer-term impacts are more 
difficult to determine and will depend on a number of factors. However, it 
is highly likely that higher taxation will lead to landlords demanding higher 
rents for a given property purchase price (that is, higher before-tax, or 
gross, rental yields). Whilst some landlords might be willing to accept 
lower after tax, or net, rental yields, other landlords will have alternative 
uses for their capital. It would therefore be expected that landlords will 
exit the market, putting upward pressure on rents, assuming unchanged 
demand by tenants. It is difficult to think of any set of plausible assumptions 
which will not, other things being equal, lead to higher housing costs for 
tenants as a result of recent tax changes.
 
At the same time, it is likely that there would be a small fall in house prices, 
but this would be very much a second-order effect. It is possible that the 
changed relationship between rents (higher) and house prices (lower) 
might lead some former renters to buy. This is one of the government’s 
stated objectives, but it should not be thought a good thing. If people are 
only buying houses because rents are artificially raised by taxes on some 
landlords, this reduces overall economic welfare.
Within the private rented sector, several things could happen. Those 
landlords who finance their property portfolio using equity or through 
corporate vehicles will be less affected by the tax changes and so will 
receive higher returns as a result of higher market rents or lower house 
prices. We could therefore expect a shift towards those types of landlords. 
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However, this result is also inefficient and wasteful: there will be incentives 
to create costly vehicles simply designed to reduce the tax burden of 
landlords. There may also be a de-professionalisation of the sector. As Kath 
Scanlon, research fellow at London School of Economics, has pointed out:
 
The one thing you can say about people with mortgages on buy-
to-let properties is that they have made a conscious decision that 
they want to be in the business of being a landlord, whereas people 
with no mortgages perhaps never made any such decision…The 
people who will leave the sector are likely to be at the more 
professional end of the small landlord spectrum and are probably 
not the ones who you would want to leave.11
These conclusions are borne out by Scanlon and Whitehead (2016). In a 
major survey of landlords, they find that 36 per cent of those buy-to-let 
landlords who expect to reduce their portfolio in the next one to five years 
cite tax reasons for doing so. A substantial proportion say that they will 
raise rents, especially for new tenants. The proportion of ‘accidental’ 
landlords has also fallen,12 which might be worrying given that they tend 
to add to the housing stock by bringing to the market houses that might 
otherwise be empty for a period or under-occupied.
Craw (2018) has argued that there will be no impact of the tax measures 
on rents because homes will simply move from the rented sector to the 
owner-occupied sector whilst not changing the supply of houses at all.13 
Unfortunately, there are a number of flaws in this argument. Firstly, there 
must be a mechanism by which buying becomes more affordable relative 
to renting, which must involve higher rents as a first-round effect. Secondly, 
those who will form the group of people who buy houses if more houses 
move into the owner-occupied sector are not necessarily current tenants 
and are very unlikely to be tenants in the properties that are sold by buy-
to-let landlords. Thirdly, if rented housing gives rise to lower net returns, 
in the long run there may simply be less investment in turning large houses 
11  See: ‘New Buy-to-Let tax “puts the UK out of step with how other countries 
approach the PRS”, says Kathleen Scanlon’, LSE London, http://lselondonhousing.
org/2015/11/20-nov-2015-new-buy-to-let-tax-puts-the-uk-out-of-step-with-how-other-
countries-approach-the-prs-says-kathleen-scanlon/
12  ‘A third of landlords with just one buy-to-let are considering selling up - but bigger 
landlords want to invest more’, This is Money, https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/
buytolet/article-5633935/Government-plan-professionalise-buy-let-working.html
13  Interestingly, Generation Rent, for which Craw works, uses exactly the opposite 
reasoning against right to buy: http://www.generationrent.org/right_to_buy
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into homes for multiple occupation or in renovating houses for letting, so 
the supply of housing in total may fall. 
Craw also argues that landlords affected by the tax measures will be undercut 
by those who will not be affected by the measures, so that rents overall will 
not rise. In theory, this could be true. But it is an unlikely outcome unless 
the supply of houses let through vehicles unaffected by the tax measures 
expands to offset the reduction in properties let by landlords who are affected. 
Even if this were so, it would simply raise the question of why tax measures 
are to be introduced that discriminate against one type of landlord and one 
type of tenancy if the effect is only to create more complex vehicles for 
buy-to-let property in order to avoid the additional taxes.
It is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby rents will not be higher than 
they would have been without these tax measures unless the changes 
lead landlords to create new corporate structures designed to avoid the 
increased tax. The tax changes have not yet had full effect and rents often 
do not increase until a new tenancy is started. As such, any leads and 
lags between the announcement of the tax measure and increases in 
rents will be long and complex. It is notable, however, that we have recently 
experienced the biggest reduction in the stock of privately-let housing 
since the liberalisation of the market at the end of the 1980s, though it is 
also impossible to know the cause of this.14
In summary, it would seem that the tax changes surrounding the private 
rented sector will be detrimental to both landlords and tenants. The changes 
will raise rents above those that would otherwise have prevailed and may 
reduce the quality of provision. It is also likely that the tax changes will 
lead to the private rented sector either de-professionalising to a greater 
extent or taking on the costs of incorporation to avoid additional taxes. 
Most published empirical work in this area has been in the form of surveys 
rather than an analysis of empirical evidence and has been produced by 
the building industry or trade bodies and can only therefore be regarded 
as indicative. By way of example, a report published by the Residential 
Landlords Association (Simcock 2018) suggests: 
 
14  See: Dwelling Stock Estimates 2017, England, https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/710382/Dwelling_
Stock_Estimates_2017_England.pdf
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The changes to Stamp Duty Land Tax with the 3% levy for private 
landlords is inhibiting further investment in the private rented sector. 
69% of landlords reported they were discouraged in purchasing 
further rental properties. […] The current study found that a majority 
of landlords (70%) reported that the changes to mortgage interest 
relief would reduce their profitability as a business, with 62% of 
landlords reporting this would reduce their profitability by at least 
20%. To mitigate the negative impact of these changes, the majority 
of landlords (67%) reported they would increase the rents.
This is a credible scenario, though second round effects, such as the 
changing of the corporate structure used by landlords, are likely to 
ameliorate the magnitude of the outcomes.
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Conclusion
In recent years, the government has changed the tax system in a way 
which leads to private landlords being taxed more harshly than other forms 
of business. Furthermore, private rented property is discriminated against, 
in a significant way, as compared with owner-occupied property. The new 
tax system could lead to penal tax rates in some circumstances. Business 
costs cannot now be fully deducted from revenues before taxes are 
calculated. In addition, property transactions taxes have been raised with 
the increase being targeted on let property. The justification for these 
decisions by the Treasury defies any basic economic analysis.
The effect of the measures will almost certainly be an increase in rents 
above the levels that would otherwise have prevailed and a reduction in 
the supply of rented housing. In addition, it is likely that the private rented 
sector will de-professionalise. Alternatively, or in addition, landlords will 
take action to avoid the higher levels of tax, which will lead to higher tax 
compliance costs – costs which, again, will almost certainly be passed on 
to tenants. There could be an overall reduction in the supply of housing.
This critique of recent tax changes raises the question of how property 
should be taxed. Some of the suggestions below would, in practice, simply 
mean a repeal of recent measures. However, the other policies suggested 
would also help to create a more efficient tax system for property more 
generally. Specifically, the authors suggest that residential property is 
taxed as follows:
 ●  Investment in property is treated like investment in any other business so 
that all business costs, including business finance costs, are deducted 
before taxable income is determined.
25
 
 
 ●  There should be no discrimination, as far as is possible, between 
different vehicles for holding property. Thus, the tax position of property 
held within a corporate vehicle should be no different from the tax 
position of property held by an individual after all income has been 
distributed to the beneficial owners.
 ●  If Stamp Duty remains, it should be charged at low levels and not 
charged at different rates for owner-occupied and let property.
 ●  As noted above, Stamp Duty is a very inefficient tax and should, ideally, 
be abolished, even if it were replaced by other forms of property tax.
 ●  A tax on imputed rent for owner occupiers could serve as a replacement 
for Council Tax and Stamp Duty. This would have the benefit of levelling 
the playing field between different forms of property ownership as well 
as between different forms of income. Furthermore, it would facilitate 
the abolition of two taxes that are inefficient from an economic welfare 
point of view (see Meakin 2016).
The recent changes to property taxation are just one aspect of an extremely 
complex UK tax code. The changes have made the tax code more complex 
and less economically coherent. A review of property taxation more 
generally could reduce the complexity of the UK tax system and make the 
system more efficient from an economic welfare point of view.
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